

[What will speed necessary decisions? In way of ^{advised} confidence, info, comm, available starting, inspiration, execution, control, feedback, planning, exercise agreements with allies.]

[C & C systems should become self-conscious of the useful states of readiness that are possible & helpful: there are Basic Symbols for state of the world.]

[Investigate:
 (risks of:
 1. Motives against:
 0000) Control
 000) Learning activity
 00) Insurance
 0) Planning
 1) Flexibility

addition to partial forces: other
ways for resources, lack of incentive,
lack of awareness, laziness, uncertainty

2) Comm with:
 staff
 leaders
 Congress
 Public
 allies
 enemy
 } consulting
 informing

Actual state of these matters

view point: actual effects in crises

neutral, covert, measures to alleviate

facts of these constraints

Possibilities for improvement

Forecasting & preparing crises & wars

3) Experiment; exercise

4) Reducing uncertainty; gaining info

5) Reducing ambiguity of policy

6) Alternative options

7) Centralization

8) Postponing decision

9) Deciding

10) Reducing risk of surprise

11) Recognizing/reporting uncertainty

[Jones: reason for belief at high headquarters that "pilots can learn only one target" (though really they know all their US bombing-test targets):

ex. a) Need for more airplanes (airplane-intensive war plans).

b) Need to simplify planning

c) Fear that alternatives will slow decision; encourage Pres. to postpone, make it harder to decide with given info (Not necessarily true)

d) Lack of confidence - choice by decision-makers

CRISIS TALK

Themes:

1. Action by: a) governments as bureaucracies
b) Heads of State as individuals
2. President's problem of anticipation: to predict opposing (and domestic) bureaucratic behavior, and opposing individual's behavior. Best situated to do this, in terms of access and experience; but hampered by lack of "research" time, temperament, limited sample of experience, lack of theoretical underpinning. Result: Pres. decisions reflect his special knowledge and guesses about such factors: but still, surprises on both sides.
3. If system is to support Pres, or get in act at all, must anticipate both opposing side and also the President (and his close advisors). Again, surprises: reflecting bad understanding of own "side" and of Pres.
4. List surprises, leading to crises:
5. Difficulties in improving understanding:
6. Pres as Black Box.
7. Bureaucracy--ours and theirs--as black box.
8. Implications of (1): fact that opposing moves are made largely by bureaucracies (rather than an individual), and that, on the other hand, certain key moves are made by a special individual: the Head of State (in US case: the President, a politician, a no-bureaucrat, but not a no-bureaucrat).
How does US gov behave differently (e.g., as seen or predicted by its opponents) because it consists of a bureaucracy-headed-by-a-politician (and acted upon by Congress, press, allies) rather than a single "rational bureaucrat"? (Robinson Crusoe politics).
- Surprise; Failure; Privacy/Secrecy; Internal Shuttling;
9. Hidden History: effects of secrecy (esp. intell), compartmentation, Pres role (specifically protected), on understanding--including President's of past crises.
10. Crises as Failures: defensive attitude toward studying, revealing nature of decision process.

11. Questions: To planning, thinking, decision-making, management, etc.

Komer, 1 Aug:

1. Since taking job, he would now be more likely to ask: "How does the President see his problem?" Importance of question: a) President is more personally influential on handling than he had realized earlier; b) answer is less obvious, more unpredictable, less open to the bureaucracy than he had realized.

To ask this question is not to have it answered. Only 4 or 5 people in a given situation are likely to know President's private thoughts, and they will vary from situation to situation, depending partly on nature of problem.

((One head of state is likely to ask this question concerning the motives of another. But he may or may not have adequate information, or have good enough judgment, to arrive at a good answer. He may think he knows, and be wrong, and be led to disastrous judgment (inexplicable to his own bureaucracy, which does not know his calculations). Hypothesis: to a widely-underestimated degree, the major actions of a nation reflect this sort of calculation by its head of state (concerning his problem and his perception of his "colleagues" problems. Heads of state guess that this process is going on, is important, and know the nature of the considerations; but they may or may not be able to guess accurately--any better than anyone else--what those others are calculating at a given moment, or how their calculations are affecting their actions.

Nevertheless, it is useful to: a) ask the question; b) make better guesses as to what you don't or can't know, and how that should affect estimates; c) know importance of trying to find out, and what to try to find out; d) at any given, point, recognize tentativeness of answers.

2. On political motives: elections, trades, alliances. Pres will expound his reasoning on rejecting or postponing a proposal to close staff like Bundy; gradually they will be educated on his thinking and will anticipate it. So Bundy and Komer will include in their own staff recommendations their estimates of the risks implicit in a decision w.r.t. the campaign, etc; political reasons for modifying statement, not telling someone, postponing, etc. These reasons, if accepted, will neither be explained to the bureaucracy nor will decision always be attributed to the President.

3. Instances of Pres (hidden) decisions: LBJ flat decision that there must not be war between Turks and Greeks. This ruled out certain possibilities for encouraging a resolution. Hidden because freedom of action can be improved by hiding decision. Also, one doesn't tell an ally who wants to act that he will absolutely not be permitted to act; save that till the "crunch" (postpone it; it may not be necessary; then, produce ad hoc reasons if possible). Rather, tell him that "first, do this or that; use force only as last resort, if these fail."

(Eisenhower decision on Suez; hidden; Dulles as front man; assurance that force would be acceptable if all else failed.

To some extent, we revealed Turk plans in our initial statements.

But such postponing puts some burden of obligation on us to solve problem our way; and if our means fail, we have led them to believe that we will go along with force.